





Margaret P. Gilbert is the Abraham I. Melden Chair in Moral Philosophy at UCI's School of Humanities. She works primarily on the philosophy of social phenomena, covering areas such as ethics, social and political philosophy, action theory, philosophy of law, epistemology, and the theory of rational choice. Prof. Gilbert has been the recipient of research fellowships from the National Endowment for the Humanities and the American Council of Learned Societies, and held visiting positions at the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, the Swedish Collegium for Advanced Study in the Social Sciences, and King's College London, among other academic institutions. Her numerous publications include: On Social Facts (1989), Sociality and Responsibility (2000), A Theory of Political Obligation (2006), Joint Commitment (2013).

First Brentano Lecture by Prof. Margaret Gilbert

Sociality and Normativity I

June 12, 2018 | Room 3D | NIG (Neues Institutsgebäude) | 16.45–18.15 Free Admission.

Discussion Meeting with Prof. Margaret Gilbert

June 13, 2018 | Room 3B | NIG (Neues Institutsgebäude) | 11.30-13.00

Only for Department Members.

Should you plan to attend this discussion meeting, please send an e-mail to: florian.kolowrat@univie.ac.at

Second Brentano Lecture by Prof. Margaret Gilbert

Sociality and Normativity II

June 14, 2018 | Room 3D | NIG (Neues Institutsgebäude) | 16.45–18.15 Free Admission.

Organization: Univ.-Prof. Mag. Dr. Herlinde Pauer-Studer and Univ.-Prof. Dr. Hans Bernhard Schmid ERC-Project: "The Normative and Moral Foundations of Group Agency" No. 740922. PI: Univ.-Prof. Mag. Dr. Herlinde Pauer-Studer

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Prof. Dr. Margaret P. Gilbert

(University of California, Irvine)

Franz Brentano Lectures on Practical Philosophy
June 12 – June 14, 2018



Franz Brentano Lectures on Practical Philosophy June 12, 2018 – June 14, 2018 Prof. Dr. Margaret P. Gilbert

Sociality and Normativity I

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Can I wrong someone in the "state of nature"—as opposed to acting wrongly in regard to them? Or must there be some actual social relation that allows for the possibility of my wronging someone? After specifying the sense of "wronging" I have in mind, I first discuss a "non-natural" case, that of informal agreements, and offer an account of these that explains their providing a context for wronging. I then critically discuss some prominent arguments that have been offered for the possibility of wronging someone in the state of nature.

Sociality and Normativity II

June 14, 2018 | Room 3D | NIG (Neues Institutsgebäude) | 16.45-18.15

This is the problem of political owing: do the members of a political society owe each other behavior supportive of the political institutions, including the laws, of that society? It is a version of the classical problem of political obligation—going back to Plato's *Crito*—which has received a variety of interpretations. Following the argument of my book *A Theory of Political Obligation* (2006), I argue that in one particular circumstance, at least, the problem has a positive solution. I then consider whether the literature in the philosophy of law on the existence of a legal system in a given population describes one or more further circumstances in which this is so, and argue that it does not. Most likely there is only one such circumstance.